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Abstract 
This chapter considers Ralph Cudworth as a philosophical critic of Hobbes. Cudworth saw Hobbes 
as a representative of the three views he was attacking: atheism, determinism, and the denial that 
morality is eternal and immutable. Moreover, he did not just criticize Hobbes by assuming that a 
general critique of those views applied to Hobbes’s particular case. Rather, he singled out Hobbes, 
often by quoting him, and argued against the distinctively Hobbesian positions he had identified.  In 
this chapter I look at Cudworth as a critic of Hobbes in two of the three central areas, atheism and 
ethics, focusing on passages where we see him explicitly picking out Hobbes. 
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1. Introducing Cudworth 
Ralph Cudworth (1617-88) was the son of a fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, where he 
himself studied and was later elected as a fellow. He became in 1645 Master of Clare College and 
Regius Professor of Hebrew, and in 1654 Master of Christ’s College. As a philosopher, he has never 
quite become a canonical figure, but was also never quite forgotten, being mentioned in such places 
as Hegel’s lectures on the history of philosophy and Ueberweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 
as well as histories of British Moralists and Cambridge Platonists. 
2 
Cudworth’s major philosophical publication in his lifetime was The True Intellectual System of 
the Universe: The First Part; Wherein, All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted; And its 
Impossibility Demonstrated (henceforth, System).1 The one modern edition in English of a work of 
Cudworth’s presents his Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (henceforth, Treatise) and his 
Treatise of Freewill (henceforth, Freewill).2 Neither of those was published in Cudworth’s lifetime, but 
they correspond to parts of a plan of writing reported in the Preface to the System. There Cudworth 
says that he aimed to write three books: one “Against Atheism”; “For such a God as is not 
meer Arbitrary Will Omnipotent, Decreeing, Doing, and Necessitating all Actions, Evil as well 
as Good; but Essentially Moral, Good and Just”; and one “Against Necessity Intrinsecall and Essentiall to 
all Action; and for such a Liberty, or Sui-Potestas, in Rational Creatures, as may render them Accountable, 
capable of Rewards and Punishments, and so Objects of Distributive or Retributive Justice”.3 The True 
Intellectual System is the first part of this, the Treatise corresponds roughly to the projected second 
book, and Freewill (and other manuscripts on that topic) to the third. 
Reading Cudworth’s philosophical works, one finds many references to other philosophers, 
often ancient philosophers. Consider for example the first chapter of the Treatise, which introduces 
the view that nothing is good or evil, just or unjust “naturally and immutably” (Cudworth 1996, 9). 
It does this by noting mentions of this view in Plato’s works, then in Aristotle’s; looking for 
evidence in Plato, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch of who the ancient proponents of this view were; 
and by observing the Epicurean history of the view. Only then does Cudworth come to a “late 
 
1 Other publications of Cudworth’s include A Discourse Concerning the True Notion of the Lord's Supper 
(1642), A Sermon Preached Before the Honourable House of Commons (1647), and A Sermon Preached to the 
Honourable Society of Lincons-Inne (1664). 
2 The edition is Cudworth (1996). A short extract from the System appears in Clarke and Collins 
(2011), and there is a modern German translation of Cudworth’s sermon preached before the House 
of Commons (Cudworth 2018). The Treatise was not published until the eighteenth century, and 
Freewill not until the nineteenth.  
3 System, “Preface to the Reader”, third un-numbered page.  
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writer of ethics and politics”, whom he quotes but does not name: Hobbes (Cudworth 1996, 13). 
The survey does not end there however, but moves to theological versions of the view, mentioning 
Ockham and others following him, before turning to “some [more recent] late authors”, most of 
whom Cudworth does not name (Cudworth 1996, 15).4 
In that chapter, as elsewhere in Cudworth’s philosophical writings, there is a great deal of 
engagement with ancient philosophy. Indeed, some people have thought of Cudworth largely as a 
historian or philologist. Cudworth was, however, consistently engaged with the philosophical views 
of his contemporaries.5 As we read his work, we see him criticizing Descartes, Gassendi, and 
Spinoza.6 But the one contemporary philosopher he comes back to again and again, even more than 
Descartes, is Hobbes. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that the System is just a giant argument against Hobbes. 
Many views that are distant from Hobbes’s are considered there. But Cudworth did see Hobbes as a 
representative of exactly the three views he was attacking: atheism, determinism, and the denial that 
morality is eternal and immutable. Moreover, he did not just criticize Hobbes by assuming that a 
 
4 The one who is named is Joannes Szydlovius. Cudworth (1996, 15) refers to his “book published at 
Franeker”, Szydlovius (1643). On Szydlovius (or Szydłowski) see Cudworth (1996, 15 n.31); Kiedroń 
(2013, 223); Kronen (2015, 239); and Wojcik (1997, 193 n.9).  
5 Locke suggested that Cudworth’s book could be used as a textbook of ancient Greek philosophy 
(Locke 1823, 9.185-186). More recently, Levitin (2016, 16) has described Cudworth “as a cutting-
edge European philologist”. 
6 In the System, there are about a dozen references to Descartes by name (System 39, 54, 161, 174-5, 
646, 672, 684, 721, 724, 761, 843, 863, 882), Gassendi’s views are noted and criticized (System 462, 
641, 697, 769), and one passage criticizes Margaret Cavendish’s views (System 137-8). Cudworth also 
cites chapters 19 (System 656) and 6 (System 707) of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. This second 
reference, to the chapter on miracles, is noted by Colie (1963, 187) and Israel (2006, 446), who both 
also argue that Cudworth’s criticism of hylozoic atheism was intended as criticism of Spinoza. 
Cudworth describes hylozoic atheism as a view “that attributes to all Matter, as such, a certain Living 
and Energetick Nature, but devoid of all Animality, Sense and Consciousness” (System 135), and says in the 
Preface to the System that he has “certain Knowledge of [this view’s] being of late Awakened and 
Revived” (ninth un-numbered page). Passmore (1990, 6) adds that “In one of his manuscripts 
Cudworth refers to Spinoza as ‘a kind of hylozoic atheist’”, referring to British Library MS 4982, 
p.55. 
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general critique of those views applied to Hobbes’s particular case. Rather, he singled out Hobbes, 
often by quoting him, and argued against the distinctively Hobbesian positions he had identified.7 In 
this chapter I look at Cudworth as a critic of Hobbes in two of the three central areas, atheism and 
ethics, focusing on passages where we see him explicitly picking out Hobbes.8 
 
2. Hobbes and atheism in the True Intellectual System 
Cudworth’s System is a defense of theism against atheism. The arguments of that defense might all 
seem to be aimed at types of position, which are associated with ancient figures, if with any 
individuals at all. There is, for example, a general attack upon atomic (or Democritick or Epicurean) 
atheism. There are also attacks on other types of atheism, which Cudworth calls hylozoic, 
hylopathian, and cosmo-plastick atheism. We might reasonably take the attack on the Epicurean 
view to be aimed in part at Hobbes.9 But there is also a more specific attack on Hobbes, in passages 
that are clearly aimed at him in particular. In those passages, Cudworth quotes and criticizes a 
“modern writer”, who is Hobbes.10 Those passages are the main focus of my discussion in this 
section. 
 
7 Mosheim’s notes (Cudworth 1733; Cudworth 1820) are helpful in identifying what passages in 
Hobbes’s work Cudworth is referring to.  
8 Space being limited, I do not here discuss Cudworth’s criticisms of Hobbes on freewill. On 
Cudworth on freewill, see Leisinger (forthcoming) and Passmore (1990). On Cudworth’s criticisms 
of Hobbes’s determinism, see Irwin (2007, 247-9).  
9 See Duncan and LoLordo (forthcoming). Sarah Hutton says that Hobbes is a hylopathian atheist, 
not an atomic one (Hutton 1996; Hutton 2013). She argues that “Hobbes, by denying the existence 
of spirit altogether, but not denying the existence of God is a material atheist of the hylopathian 
variety” (Hutton 1996, 27). Cudworth, however, thought that Hobbes denied the existence of God. 
Beyond that, Cudworth’s main contrast between hylopathian and atomic atheism seems to lie in the 
conception of matter, not in a different view about the existence of God. Thus he distinguishes “the 
Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from Dead and Stupid Matter in the way of 
Qualities and Forms, Generable and Corruptible” from “the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the 
same thing in the way of Atoms and Figures” (System 135). 
10 It depends a little on how one counts, but there something like seventeen such passages with 
identifiable direct references.  
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The passages that quote Hobbes are in chapter 2, where Cudworth is presenting arguments 
for atheism, and in chapter 5, where he is responding to them. In those passages, six themes emerge: 
(1) the argument for atheism from our having no idea of God (which connects to Hobbes’s 
deflationary account of apparent descriptions of God's attributes); (2) the explanatory role of fear in 
Hobbes’s view; (3) arguments from principles of motion and causation; (4) the role of politicians; (5) 
knowledge, understanding, and nominalism; and (6) materialism about the mind.11 In this section I 
concentrate on the first of these themes, which is the one about which Cudworth has most to say. 
Looking at what he says about it shows us how he understands Hobbes’s views, as well as how he 
wants to criticize them. 
 
2.1 An argument for atheism 
My starting point here comes from the beginning of Cudworth’s exposition of arguments for 
atheism: 
The grounds of Reason alledged for the Atheistical Hypothesis are chiefly these that follow. 
First, That we have no Idea of God, and therefore can have no Evidence of him; which 
Argument is further flourisht and descanted upon in this manner. That Notion or 
Conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a Bundle of 
Incomprehensibles, Unconceivables, and Impossibles; it being only a compilement of all 
Imaginable Attributes of Honour, Courtship, and Complement, which the Confounded 
Fear, and Astonishment of Mens minds, made them huddle up together, without any Sence 
or Philosophick Truth (System 63). 
 
11 For relevant texts in the System on the explanatory role of fear, see System 63-4, 68-9, 96-7, 650-1, 
655-6, and 891-2; on the role of politicians, 96-7, 697-9, and 891-2; on principles of motion and 
causation, 76-7 and 667-9; on knowledge, understanding, and nominalism, 730-2 and 853-4; and on 
materialism about the mind, 760-2 and 840-1. 
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Cudworth follows that with two passages from Hobbes: a paraphrase of a discussion of the 
attributes of God early in the Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance (EW V.6), and a quote 
from chapter 46 of Leviathan on the same topic (Hobbes 2012, 1086; 1651, 374).12  
In the discussion of this first argument for atheism we find an allegedly Hobbesian argument 
for atheism from the claim that we have no idea of God; the connection of that argument to 
Hobbes’s views about divine attributes; an explicit connection to Hobbes himself by quotation; and 
then, after the quotes, a mention of the role that Hobbes gives to fear in explaining religious belief.  
The argument for atheism itself seems to have this structure: 
1. We have no idea of God; 
2. If we can have no idea of something, then it does not exist; so 
3. God does not exist. 
Note what the conclusion here says about Cudworth’s understanding of Hobbes. First, Cudworth 
believes that Hobbes is an atheist, in the sense that he denies the existence of God.13 Secondly, by 
associating this conclusion with Hobbes, Cudworth commits himself to a suspicious reading of 
Hobbes, on what Hobbes does not mean what he says.14 Hobbes, after all, does not say that God 
does not exist—indeed he keeps saying that He does.15 
In his initial presentation, Cudworth gives us no quotation to connect the first premise to 
Hobbes, but it clearly is a claim Hobbes makes. Consider, for example, Hobbes’s Objections to 
 
12 Cudworth gestures towards there being other passages; we might add De Cive 15.14 and a passage 
in chapter 31 of Leviathan (Hobbes 2012, 566; 1651, 190). 
13 That is, Cudworth does not just use ‘atheist’ to describe heterodox views about the nature of God, 
or as a mere term of abuse. 
14 Note the related suspicious reading of Gassendi, “another Learned Well-willer to Atheism” (System 
641). 
15 This is not the place to talk at length about the pros and cons of suspicious readings of 
philosophers. I note however that Hobbes said plenty of controversial things, even if we take him at 
face value. If we are to give a suspicious reading of Hobbes, we will need a fairly complex theory of 
what he was up to—what he certainly did not do, was hide a controversial view behind a 
conventional facade. 
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Descartes’s Meditations. In the Meditations, Descartes offers two arguments for the existence of God, 
both of which begin by focusing on the meditator’s idea of God. Hobbes objects to those 
arguments by denying that we have an idea of God.16 
Premise 2 is more puzzling. Cudworth himself seemingly grants the acceptability of the 
premise, but does Hobbes believe or assert it? 17 Hobbes seems to grant the existence of things of 
which we have no idea, most obviously God. (Hobbes believes we have a way to think about God 
that does not involve having an idea of him—a way of thinking of God relationally, with no 
conception of his intrinsic features.) Cudworth, however, is inclined to take Hobbes as deriving non-
existence from inconceivability. Perhaps Cudworth thought that a version of the argument from 
inconceivability to non-existence was a good one, and thus an uncontroversial attribution. But it is a 
little tricky to pin this on Hobbes, and this makes a significant difference to how one understands 
Hobbes. With this premise at hand, Hobbes has an obvious argument for atheism. Without it, he 
has a point about the extreme limits of our ability to think about God. 
 
2.2 Cudworth’s arguments that we do have an idea of God 
 
16 A note on terminology: Cudworth talks of ideas, and Hobbes uses that language when talking with 
Descartes, but generally prefers other terms elsewhere, such as ‘phantasm’. I use ‘idea’ throughout 
the discussion in this chapter. 
17 Cudworth grants the claim “That what is so Utterly Unconceivable, as that no man can frame any 
manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either in it self, or at least to us, Nothing (System 638). 
Why should one think this? Here Cudworth tells us that there is “some Truth in that of Aristotle, 
that … the Rational Soul or Mind, is in a manner All things; it being able to frame some Idea and 
Conception or other, of whatsoever is in the Nature of things, and hath either an Actual or Possible 
Existence, from the very Highest to the Lowest. Mind and Understanding is as it were a Diaphanous 
and Crystalline Globe, or a kind of Notional World, which hath some Reflex Image, and correspondent 
Ray, or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the True and Real World of Being And upon this 
account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own Nature Absolutely Unconceivable, is indeed a Non-
Entity” (System 638). Whatever else we say about this, we can agree that it does not give us a 
Hobbesian reason to endorse premise 2. 
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In responding to this argument for atheism, Cudworth’s focus is on the first premise. He replies to 
the view that there is no idea of God, and to various arguments for it. Indeed, all of chapter 4 of the 
True Intellectual System is devoted to arguing that we do indeed have an idea of God. That is a long 
and complex chapter, filling over 400 pages. Much of it is occupied by discussions of pagan 
polytheism, and the question of what, if any, ideas of divinities those pagans had. Before that 
however, we find discussion of what the idea of God is: “the true and genuine Idea of God in general, 
is this, A Perfect Conscious Understanding Being (or Mind) Existing of it self from Eternity, and the Cause of all 
other things” (System 195).18 Even before that, Cudworth gives us two arguments that we do have an 
idea of God. He argues first that people who speak different languages all think about God, so there 
must be some idea they share (System 192). His second argument is that atheists have an idea of God, 
which they rely on in denying the existence of God (System 194). 
These arguments succeed, at least, in pointing out that we seem to have some way of 
thinking of God. Given certain assumptions, it might seem obvious to conclude from that that we 
have an idea of God. But Hobbes has another way of accounting for the phenomena. We can, he 
grants, think about God relationally, as the cause of the world. This does not involve having an idea 
of God or any grasp on God’s intrinsic features, because an idea of God would be an (impossible) 
image of God. Cudworth thus seems off target in his criticism of Hobbes here, or at least to need to 
say more. Indeed, there is an ambiguity about what it is to have an idea of God.19 If it is just to have 
some way of thinking about God, Hobbes and Cudworth agree that we have it. If it is to have an 
image of God, they agree that we do not. If it is to have an idea of “A Perfect Conscious Understanding 
 
18 Although “none should be condemned for Absolute Atheists, merely because they hold Eternal 
Uncreated Matter, unless they also deny, an Eternal Unmade Mind, ruling over the Matter, and so 
make Sensless Matter the Sole Original of all things” (System 199). 
19 Similarly, Cudworth had begun this discussion by invoking “Modern Atheists” who “stick not to 
maintain, That the Word God hath no Signification” (System 192), which sounds vaguely Hobbesian, but 
it is not quite Hobbes.  
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Being (or Mind) Existing of it self from Eternity, and the Cause of all other things”, then Cudworth thinks we 
have it, and Hobbes disagrees. Indeed, if it is to have any positive conception of the attributes of 
God, then again, Cudworth thinks we have it, and Hobbes disagrees. 20 
 
2.3 Cudworth’s response to arguments that we have no idea of God 
Aside from responding to the view that there is no idea of God, Cudworth also responds to 
arguments for it. We see these responses in his reply to the first argument for atheism at the start of 
chapter 5 of the System. There he lists arguments for the claim that we have no idea of God. 
First, That we have no Idea nor Thought of any thing not Subject to Corporeal Sense; nor the least Evidence 
of the Existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, That Theists themselves acknowledging God 
to be Incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a Non-Entity. Thirdly, That the Theists Idea 
of God including Infinity in it, is therefore absolutely Unconceivable and Impossible. Fourthly, That 
Theology is an Arbitrarious Compilement of Inconsistent and Contradictious Notions; And Lastly, That 
the Idea and Existence of God ows all its being, either to the Confounded Non-Sence of Astonish'd 
Minds; or else to the Fiction and Imposture of Politicians (System 634). 
Note three arguments here. Argument 1 is based on the thought that all our ideas, thoughts, and 
evidence derive from our senses. Argument 2 is based on the observation that theists say God is 
incomprehensible. Argument 3 moves from observing the claim that God is infinite, through the 
view that the infinite is inconceivable, to the conclusion that we have no idea of (such an infinite) 
God.21 
 
20 This is much the same as the situation in Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s Meditations: Hobbes 
and Descartes agree that we have some way to think about God, and that we have no image of God, 
but disagree about whether we have the idea of God that Descartes’s meditator claims to have, and 
indeed about whether we have any positive conception of the attributes of God. 
21 A final thought involves giving alternative, deflationary explanations of our thoughts of God, 
explanations that may be psychological or political. This consideration works in a different way than 
the others—it is not really an argument that we have no idea of God—and is not discussed below. 
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Argument 1. Ideas come from sense. Cudworth associates this sub-argument directly with 
Hobbes (System 634-7).22 Our ideas, Hobbes says, come from sensation and are image-like. They are 
ideas or phantasms of the imagination. We see a set of connected views here: that ideas are images, 
that they come from sense, and that we possess sense and imagination but not a further faculty of 
intellect. From this Cudworth draws the conclusion that, for Hobbes, things of which we can have 
no images, no sense-derived ideas, cannot be conceived.  
Cudworth’s reply to this argument starts with the thought that there is a higher faculty than 
sense (or, indeed, than imagination). The allegedly Hobbesian view makes sense the judge of all 
existence, but according to Cudworth there is a higher faculty, reason, which is a judge of these 
things, and leads us to things that sense cannot reach. More basically, on Cudworth’s view, there are 
ideas which are not phantasms or images, and do not have phantasms “belonging to” them (System 
636). Cudworth indeed gives the idea of God as an example here, which might indeed have seemed 
to him to be the clearest example, but was of course a contested one. 
Argument 2. Theists say God is incomprehensible. More than once in the Third Objections, 
Hobbes appeals to the Christian view that God is inconceivable in support of his view that we have 
no idea of God.23 That is, Hobbes does indeed appear to have given this argument that Cudworth 
discusses. 
 
22 Thus he quotes the final paragraph of chapter 3 of Leviathan: “Thus a Modern Atheistick Writer; 
Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been Perceived first by Sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no 
Thought representing any thing not Subject to Sense. From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not Sensible 
and Imaginable, is utterly unconceivable and to us Nothing” (System 634). 
23 Note a comment in Hobbes’s fifth objection—“this is why we are forbidden to worship God in 
the form of an image; for otherwise we might think that we were conceiving of him who is incapable 
of being conceived” (AT 7.180, CSM 2.127)—and one in his eleventh—“Since it has not been 
demonstrated that we have the idea of God, and since the Christian religion obliges us to believe 
that God cannot be conceived of (which means, in my view, that we can have no idea of him), it 
follows that no demonstration has been given of the existence of God, let alone the creation” (AT 
7.189, CSM 2.133). 
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Cudworth responds to this argument at some length, but his key move is to deny that the 
incomprehensible is inconceivable. God is incomprehensible, which is to say that we cannot have a 
conception of God that is “fully Adequate and Commensurate to” God (System 638). But this is not to 
say that we cannot conceive of God at all, only that we cannot fully understand God. Indeed, 
Cudworth argues, this is not such an unusual situation. It is common for us to be unable to grasp 
the essences of things: “even Body it self […] hath such puzzling Difficulties and Entanglements in 
the Speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from” (System 639). But that 
does not show that we have no ideas of those things, or that we cannot think about them at all. The 
same goes for God, even though God “is more Incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever” 
(System 639). 
Argument 3. God is said to be infinite. In considering the third argument, we find an even 
clearer connection to Hobbes. For in replying to this argument—which involves the claim that God 
is inconceivable because infinite—Cudworth again quotes Hobbes.24 
In discussing this argument, Cudworth grants to the atheist that there is no phantasm (or 
imagistic idea) of the infinite. But this is of course not what he thinks the main issue is, as he does 
not think all ideas are phantasms. Cudworth also grants that we cannot fully comprehend the 
infinite. Indeed he goes further and grants that there are some infinites of which we have no idea: 
“That as for those Infinities, of Number, of Corporeal Magnitude, and of Time or Successive Duration, we 
have not only no Phantasm, nor Full Intellectual Comprehension of them, but also no manner of Intelligible 
Idea, Notion or Conception” (System 643). His central reason is that in these cases there are no actual 
infinites, only potential ones. If we think we have an idea of actual infinite space, for example, we 
 
24 Cudworth quotes De Corpore 26.1 and chapter 3 of Leviathan (Hobbes 2012, 46; 1651, 11). We see 
this thought back in the Third Objections as well (AT 7.186, CSM 2.131). 
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are merely confused. Cudworth takes it, however, that the case of God is different.25 We have some 
notion of God as an infinite being, though we do not fully understand the infinity of God. This 
connects, then, to the general question of how, and to what degree, we can think about or 
understand God. Cudworth grants we do not have a complete understanding, but does think that we 
have ideas that represent God’s nature, above and beyond the merely relational conception Hobbes 
thinks we have. 
Cudworth’s criticism of Hobbes’s view that we have no idea of God is closely connected to 
his criticism of Hobbes’s theory of the language we apparently use to describe the attributes of God. 
These two issues also have a close connection in Hobbes’s thought. Our inability to form an idea of 
God is our inability to form a positive, non-relational conception of him. If we had such a 
conception, it would involve conceiving some of God’s attributes—e.g., if we had an idea of God as 
an omniscient being, it would involve a conception of God’s omniscience. The absence of such an 
idea involves, indeed basically just is, the absence of a positive conception of God’s attributes. 
Such conceptions may be absent, but people clearly do use language that seems to describe 
God’s attributes. What is such language doing, in the absence of those conceptions? Hobbes’s 
response to that situation is to argue that such language has a purpose, but the purpose is not to 
describe God’s attributes. Language can be used to praise and honor God, without describing him.  
Cudworth was well aware of this theory of Hobbes’s.26 He himself had a very different 
approach, and a significant part of his reply to Hobbes’s view consists in stating his view that we do 
have an idea of God as a perfect being. On the one hand, this idea is simple. On the other, we can 
 
25 Cudworth thinks that God has infinite duration—though infinite duration “cannot possibly 
belong to any Successive Being” (System 645), it can belong to God. 
26 He quotes several relevant passages: two from chapter 46 of Leviathan, one quoted at System 650 
(Hobbes 2012, 1078; 1651, 371) and later one (in Hobbes’s text) quoted at System 63-4 (Hobbes 
2012, 1086; 1651, 374); De Corpore 7.12, quoted at System 641; and the Questions concerning Liberty, 
Necessity, and Chance (EW 5.6), quoted at System 63. 
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demonstrate that a perfect being has indeed the various divine attributes. Cudworth grants, again, 
that we lack full understanding in this realm.  Moreover, he suggests that talking in terms of multiple 
divine attributes is itself a sign of our lack of understanding in this realm. God’s attributes are, on 
this story, “but so many Partial and Inadequate Conceptions, of One and the Same, Simple Perfect Being, 
taken in as it were by piecemeal: by reason of the Imperfection of our Humane Understandings, 
which could not fully Conceive it all together at once” (System 652). But this is not to say that talk of 
God’s attributes is insignificant, or not descriptive at all. It may involve limited and imperfect 
descriptions but they are indeed, contrary to Hobbes, descriptions. 
 
3. Morality in the Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality 
3.1 The structure and topics of the Treatise 
In the scheme announced at the start of the System, Cudworth’s second book is supposed to tell us 
that there is such a “God as is not meer Arbitrary Will Omnipotent, Decreeing, Doing, and Necessitating all 
Actions, Evil as well as Good; but Essentially Moral, Good and Just”. From that, one might expect a 
book focused on God. From the title of the Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality (which 
corresponds, if anything does, to that projected second book) one might expect it to be a book 
focused on morality. On reading the Treatise, what one finds is a book focused on epistemology and 
psychology, where there is a lot of material on, for instance, the distinction between sense and 
intellect. 
Though much shorter than the System, the Treatise is divided into four books. The first, and 
probably best-known, focuses on the question whether morality can depend on decision alone, 
human or divine. That leads Cudworth to a discussion in the second book of the view that there are 
no immutable natures or essences, a view he connects to Protagoras, among others. At the end of 
that book, Cudworth concludes that there is “another principle in us superior to sense, which judges 
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what is absolutely and not fantastically or relatively only true or false” (Treatise 48). Starting from 
there, the third book discusses the difference between sense and knowledge, sensitive and 
intellectual cogitation. The fourth book continues that discussion, finding that the mind can, by its 
active powers, know the intelligible, immutable natures of things. Moral good and evil, just and 
unjust must themselves, according to Cudworth, have such natures. 
Where does Hobbes fit in that long epistemological discussion? Cudworth’s arguments for 
intellect as a source of knowledge are anti-Hobbesian, but they do not usually pick him out or argue 
against him explicitly. One notable exception is an explicit argument against Hobbes’s nominalism 
(Treatise 116ff.). Hobbes of course thinks there are such things as reason and knowledge, but he 
understands them very differently than Cudworth does. His account does not include the thing that 
Cudworth emphasizes, the active mind that can grasp intellectual natures. Hobbes does think there 
is universal thought, and science, but he thinks those can be enabled by adding the power of 
language to an underlying psychology of imagistic representation. Cudworth thinks that is not 
enough to get us genuine knowledge. Meanwhile, Hobbes believes that the epistemic activity 
Cudworth finds most important, the active mind cognizing immutable natures, simply does not 
exist, so does not need to be explained. 
 
3.2 Against the view that morality depends on decision 
Book 1 of Cudworth’s Treatise contains a relatively short, and apparently free-standing, argument 
that morality cannot arise merely from decisions, either human or divine. In recent decades, this has 
perhaps been the most-discussed part of Cudworth’s work. 
The question that connects the start and end of the Treatise is whether morality depends on 
God’s will or his intellect. Those who think it depends on his will (thus, on decision-making) are 
Cudworth’s primary target in the first book, before he starts to build his case that morality in fact 
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depends on God’s intellect. Hobbes—despite Cudworth’s general interest in arguing against him—is 
rather an incidental target of the early argument. Hobbes agrees with Cudworth’s main targets that 
morality depends on decision, but thinks that human decisions, not divine ones, are what’s 
important (on Cudworth’s reading of Hobbes, and many others).27  
The central passage in Cudworth’s argument is the following. 
Wherefore in the first place, it is a thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, that moral 
good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (if they be not mere names without any 
signification, or names for nothing else but willed and commanded, but have a reality in 
respect of the persons obliged to do and avoid them) cannot possibly be arbitrary things, 
made by will without nature; because it is universally true, that things are what they are, not 
by will but by nature. As for example, things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness, 
triangular by triangularity, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality, that 
is, by such certain natures of their own. Neither can Omnipotence itself (to speak with 
reverence) by mere will make a thing white or black without whiteness or blackness; that is, 
without such certain natures, whether we consider them as qualities in the objects without us 
according to the Peripatetical philosophy, or as certain dispositions of parts in respect of 
magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which beget those sensations or phantasms of white and 
black in us (Treatise 16). 28 
 
27 Here as elsewhere, Cudworth includes Hobbes among his atheistic opponents, not those with 
(merely) the wrong theological views. Thus, as far as Cudworth’s reading of Hobbes goes, I disagree 
with Irwin (2007, 250), who says “Hobbes accepts voluntarism by treating the laws of nature as the 
commands of God”. That is not an implausible reading of Hobbes, but it is not Cudworth’s reading 
of him. 
28 On the Platonic heritage of this argument of Cudworth’s, see Irwin (2003; 2006). But see also his 
comments on Cudworth as defending certain Scholastic views about the will and morality against 
Hobbes’s criticisms (Irwin 2007, 240). 
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Some commentators have thought this argument fails, because it is merely tautological.29 Cudworth 
does rely on the claim that “things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness, triangular by 
triangularity, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality”, which sounds like a list 
of tautologies. His talk about natures is relevant though. Something cannot be made white, he says, 
without also being given the nature of a white thing—even God cannot simply declare something to 
now be white. Taking the talk about natures in a mechanical way, even God would have to arrange 
the small parts of the object so as to make it white.30 That new arrangement of the small parts then 
explains why the object is now white. 
Thus, when Cudworth says “things are white by whiteness”, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’ name 
two different things. On the one hand there’s a way the object is: in this case, white. On the other 
hand, there’s the underlying nature—what Cudworth calls the ‘whiteness’—that explains why the 
object is that way. Sticking with the mechanical explanation, the whiteness is, roughly, the 
arrangement of the small parts of the object. Saying that the whiteness makes the thing white is 
giving an abbreviated explanation, not stating a tautology. 
More generally, Cudworth claims that things do not acquire features just by decision, even 
by divine decision, but by acquiring the nature of a thing with that feature. Applying this principle to 
the case of goodness, even God cannot make thing good just by deciding it shall be good, for even 
God has also to give it the underlying nature of a good thing, whatever that may be. 
In thinking about this argument, several possible objections might come to mind.  
First, note that Cudworth is assuming that the principle about natures that holds in the 
examples above, about whiteness and so on, also holds of goodness. Perhaps it does, but it is open 
 
29 Zagorin (1992, 131-2). Compare Passmore (1990, 41-2). 
30 Cudworth thinks the argument would work equally well, if one took the talk about natures in a 
“Peripatetical” way. The key thought is that the presence of a feature must have an underlying 
explanation (which does not merely state an efficient cause). 
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to someone to respond that it does not—that goodness works differently. This non-reductive sort 
of response seems not open to Hobbes, though. 
Secondly, there is a question about what the underlying nature is, that makes something 
good. For Cudworth’s purposes here, however, we do not need to know what the nature is, just to 
recognize that there must be one (and that it does not just consist in having been decided).31 
Thirdly, one might argue in response to Cudworth that not all obligations arise from the 
natures of the things we are obliged to do. For instance, if I promise to do X, there may be nothing 
in X considered alone that makes it obligatory. It nevertheless is obligatory, but just because I 
promised to do it.  
Cudworth responds to that sort of objection, granting that in some cases a command can 
make a thing obligatory, when before we were obliged neither to do it nor to refrain from it. 
However, he says, this cannot be the source of all obligations. A command to do X would not create 
an obligation to do the intrinsically morally neutral X unless one were already obliged to obey the 
command. Thus:  
we shall find that even in positive commands themselves, mere will doth not make the thing 
commanded just or obligatory, or beget and create any obligation to obedience; but that it is 
natural justice or equity which gives to one the right or equity of commanding, and begets in 
another duty and obligation to obedience (Treatise 18). 
Cudworth’s view is that, although some obligations may arise from commands or decisions, not all 
obligations may do so. Any obligation that arises from a command or decision must ultimately 
depend on an obligation that doesn’t so arise. In a simple case, the dependence will be easy to see. 
Suppose we are obliged to obey the monarch’s command because of the nature of the monarch, and 
the monarch commands that we do X. We become, thus, obliged to do X. The obligation to do X is 
 
31 On Cudworth on the nature of goodness, see Irwin (2007, 254). 
18 
not ultimately explained by the decision alone. The explanation requires, rather, that the monarch be 
such they you should obey their decisions.32 More complicated cases are possible, but still, Cudworth 
says, there must be that basic obligation, one not grounded in a mere command, for the whole 
scheme to work.33 
Evaluating this argument as criticism of Hobbes is tricky, insofar as it requires us first to say 
something about how exactly Hobbes thinks obligation arises. The question of where to locate the 
origin of normativity in Hobbes’s system is not my topic here. Cudworth does however point us 
towards the difficult questions in that area. There are ways of reading Hobbes that find there is one 
basic obligation in Hobbes’s system, from which others derive. If there is one basic obligation in the 
system, what is it and where does it come from? If there is none—if there really are just decisions at 
the base, and nothing else—why is there any normativity in the system at all? 
 
4. Conclusion 
Cudworth engaged repeatedly with Hobbes’s philosophical writings. Hobbes, whom Cudworth saw 
as an atheist determinist who denied the eternal and immutable nature of morality, was a 
representative of all that Cudworth thought was bad in philosophy. But he was not just a 
representative of a broader trend—Cudworth picked out particular Hobbesian texts by quotation, 
and engaged with them in some detail. 
We can see some of the broader disagreements of Hobbes and Cudworth, by looking at 
what they say about whether we have an idea of God. Most simply, Cudworth says we do, while 
 
32 We might even say the obligation is grounded in the nature of X, if having been commanded by 
the monarch counts as part of the nature of X. See Prior (1949, 21). More generally, there are 
questions about what is to be included in the natures of things here. (For instance, does the relevant 
nature here include some fact about the monarch’s relation to you, which explains by you must obey 
this monarch and not another?) 
33 For a possible response to this objection from Hobbes’s perspective, see Irwin (2007, 258). 
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Hobbes says we do not. Looking a little further, we see two different views about what ideas are, 
with Hobbes thinking they are all images, and Cudworth denying that. Looking beyond that, we see 
two different pictures of knowledge and the mind: Hobbes’s view that relies just on the imagination 
and language being opposed by Cudworth’s view of the intellect as an active being, capable of 
grasping eternal natures. 
Sticking more closely to the question about God, we see Cudworth as an early suspicious 
reader of Hobbes: not accepting him as giving an account of out very limited ability to conceive of 
God, but taking him to deny God’s existence, and to argue for that on the basis of our having no 
idea of God. 
Issues about eternal natures arises again when we think about morality. Hobbes may not be 
the main target of Cudworth’s argument that morality is not a matter of decision, but he is a target. 
Cudworth’s criticism here points for us to a recurring and difficult question about Hobbes, the 




34 I thank Antonia LoLordo for her comments on a draft of this chapter. 
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